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WHY AND HOW TO TEACH FEDERAL COURTS TODAY 
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.* 
INTRODUCTION 
The nature of the Federal Courts course, its difficulty, and its relation to 
the rest of the law school curriculum have emerged over time as subjects of 
myth, anxiety, and misunderstanding.  On the one hand, a myth holds that a 
sophisticated Federal Courts course should yield insights more profound than 
those that emerge from any other public law offering.  This myth can raise 
expectations mightily high, among students and also among Federal Courts 
teachers.  On the other hand, many Federal Courts professors feel an increasing 
anxiety that their field has slipped into intellectual disrepute among their 
faculty colleagues—that while understanding in other fields has been propelled 
forward by interdisciplinary studies, Federal Courts subsists in a time warp, 
still dominated by a 1950s-vintage Legal Process methodology.1  In my view, 
both the myth and the anxiety reflect misunderstandings that bear directly on 
why and how Federal Courts ought to be taught today.  In commenting on the 
why and how of Federal Courts teaching, I thus begin with some reflections on 
what I take to be the myth and what I know to be a prominent anxiety among 
Federal Courts professors. 
A. The Myth 
More than fifty years after the publication of the first edition of Hart and 
Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System (Hart and Wechsler),2 
Henry Hart remains not only the most influential scholar ever to write about 
 
* Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School.  I am grateful to Dan 
Meltzer for helpful comments on an earlier draft and to Steven Horowitz for outstanding research 
assistance. 
 1. I previously reflected on this anxiety in Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart 
and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953 (1994).  For a recent, trenchant account of some 
of the perils of a preference among courts and lawyers to deal with “process” rather than 
substantive issues, see Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1013 (2008). 
 2. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1st ed. 1953).  The book is currently in its sixth edition, published in 2009, of 
which the editors are John F. Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer, David L. Shapiro, and I. 
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Federal Courts issues, but also, in many minds, the prototypical Federal Courts 
professor.  Hart liked to hold his classes at lunchtime, and his students, who 
often found his lectures impenetrable, referred to the course as “Darkness at 
Noon.”3  Yet none, so far as I can gather, ever ascribed the difficulty to Hart’s 
being inarticulate or unprepared—any more than readers of his famous 
Dialogue4 on congressional power to control federal jurisdiction have thought 
that he employed two characters expressing sometimes opposing views 
because he lacked the intellectual rigor to work out a consistent position.  No, 
Henry Hart was profound.  Accordingly, it was more natural than surprising 
that students might fail to understand the finer points of his analysis—just as, 
for example, lesser mortals might come up short in their efforts to grasp 
Einstein’s equations. 
No one expects every Federal Courts teacher to replicate the trenchancy of 
Professor Hart.  Nevertheless, the myth has taken hold in some quarters that a 
deep comprehension of the Federal Courts subject matter necessarily 
encompasses public law’s foundational truths.  To teach Federal Courts 
competently, this myth suggests, we Federal Courts teachers must at least be 
able to do the legal equivalent of explicating Einstein’s theories, even if we are 
not up to original work in quantum mechanics. 
In my experience, many students still come to the Federal Courts course 
with the sense of excitement and trepidation that Henry Hart once inspired.  
They expect to struggle, but they hope to emerge with a depth of insight to 
which they could not aspire in other public law classes. 
B. The Anxiety 
The anxiety that surrounds Federal Courts has a dual aspect, reflected 
differently in students and teachers.  Students fear that they will prove unequal 
to the demands that Federal Courts makes upon them.  Despite their best 
efforts, the course’s insights may elude them. 
For professors, the anxiety is different and more demoralizing: It is that the 
myth of Federal Courts is a fraud.  There are no deep mysteries, only complex 
legal doctrines.  What is worse, many Federal Courts teachers worry that what 
they do—pursuing many of the same kinds of questions that the first edition of 
the Hart and Wechsler casebook framed in 1953—taints them as antediluvian 
in the eyes of their colleagues.  They fear that Federal Courts is an “intellectual 
backwater,”5 penetrated by none of the interdisciplinary analysis that produces 
 
 3. See James E. Pfander, Fifty Years (More or Less) of “Federal Courts”: An Anniversary 
Review, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1083, 1098–99 (2002). 
 4. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal 
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953). 
 5. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 955 (quoting Bruce Ackerman, Sterling Professor of Law 
and Political Science, Yale Law School). 
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much of the best work in the legal academy today.  From this perspective, the 
analogue to Henry Hart might not be Einstein but Sigmund Freud—a once-
towering figure whose pretension to have pioneered a science of the mind 
never fulfilled its promise.  To adhere to an unreconstructed Freudian theory 
today would be to exhibit a willful blindness to subsequent progress in 
medicine, psychology, neurobiology, and, what is more, to the methods of 
inquiry that have made that progress possible.  Could something similar be said 
of those who continue along paths first marked by Hart and Wechsler? 
This thought has sometimes given me pause.  When students tell me that 
they are excited by Federal Courts, or that it has challenged them more than 
any other course, what should I say?  Should I tell them no, they should not be 
excited, that if the course exhibits a façade of intellectual depth, it is only a 
façade?  This has been among my pedagogical anxieties. 
C. The Misunderstanding 
But the anxiety, I have come to believe, is largely (although not wholly) an 
outgrowth of the myth of Federal Courts—which is, and probably always has 
been, a myth.  And if the myth reflects misunderstanding, it becomes possible 
to think that maybe the anxiety reflects misunderstanding as well.  The 
misunderstanding—as I would now describe it—is that Federal Courts is either 
a course in which transcendent insight can be expected or one so mired in 
outdated modes of thought that Federal Courts teachers ought to be ashamed. 
Federal Courts is a course about complex legal doctrines, and their 
relationships to one another, that should be taught in roughly the same way that 
any other course about complex legal doctrines should be taught today.  
Teachers should avail themselves of whatever theories, interdisciplinary tools, 
and methodological perspectives seem most fruitful in examining the issues at 
hand.  There need be nothing un-intellectual, anti-intellectual, or backwater-ish 
about the way that Federal Courts professors structure their classes or pursue 
their scholarship. 
What is distinctive about Federal Courts is its subject matter, a topic about 
which I shall say more below.  For now, with the focus on pedagogy, suffice it 
to say that the topics embraced in a Federal Courts course are ones that become 
possible for students to pursue only near the end of their law school careers, 
after they have completed many other courses.  Federal Courts presupposes 
knowledge of Constitutional Law, Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and 
Administrative Law and of the issues of constitutional and statutory 
interpretation that will have arisen in those and other prior courses.  It is thus a 
capstone course in which students and teachers not only pursue advanced 
inquiries (as measured by the rest of the law school curriculum), but also 
assess how parts of the subject matter of those other courses do and should 
relate to one another.  The Federal Courts course permits students to pull 
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together much of what they have learned in other courses and to achieve a 
deeper, richer synthesis. 
For synthesis to be valuable, it need neither expose nor resolve any 
ultimate legal mysteries.  Federal Courts is just another course in American 
public law.  In some aspects, the tangle of doctrines that makes up the subject 
matter of Federal Courts is just that—a tangle.  If so, Federal Courts professors 
owe no apology.  There should be no extraordinary burden associated with 
teaching Federal Courts and no extraordinary anxiety. 
Just as teachers of any other course would do, we Federal Courts 
professors should figure out what we want to teach in light of reflections on 
why we would want to teach it and then determine how best to do so.  In the 
remainder of this essay, I shall offer some personal reflections about the what, 
the why, and the how of teaching a Federal Courts course. 
I.  WHAT IS THE FEDERAL COURTS COURSE? 
In describing the myth and the anxiety associated with teaching Federal 
Courts, I have had in mind the kind of course that the Hart and Wechsler 
casebook, entitled The Federal Courts and the Federal System, contemplates.  
Although I am now a co-editor of that book, my co-editors and I can claim no 
credit for the book’s most extraordinary influence,6 which flows predominantly 
from the first edition, published in 1953, and from the first edition’s success in 
defining the field as we now conceive it.7 
Judgments concerning the appropriate subject matter of a course on 
Federal Courts or Federal Jurisdiction do not flow inevitably from the course’s 
title.  One obvious way to design the course would be as a study of advanced 
topics in federal Civil Procedure.  But Professors Hart and Wechsler rejected 
this approach and instead compiled a set of materials on the federal courts and 
the federal system.  The italicized words dramatically expand the scope of 
inquiry by implicating large and recurring issues involving federalism, the 
separation of powers, and the division of labor between federal courts and state 
courts.  One need only read through the chapter headings of the most recent 
edition of Hart and Wechsler—which continue to span the subject matter of 
most Federal Courts courses taught today—in order to grasp the breadth and 
depth of the book’s concerns.8 
 
 6. Indeed, I seldom see Henry Monaghan, a leading scholar for more than three decades, 
without his telling me that my colleagues and I have “ruined” Hart and Wechsler by “dumbing it 
down.” 
 7. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 960–61 & n.37. 
 8. The chapter titles are as follows: Chapter I: The Development and Structure of the 
Federal Judicial System; Chapter II: The Nature of the Federal Judicial Function: Cases and 
Controversies; Chapter III: The Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; Chapter IV: 
Congressional Control of the Distribution of Judicial Power Among Federal and State Courts; 
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Although probably no Federal Courts teacher teaches all of the Hart and 
Wechsler chapters in a single course, two large generalizations likely apply to 
any curricular offering—including those taught out of other casebooks—that 
address more than a few of the book’s topics.  First, the course will cover more 
doctrinally intricate subject areas than students could reasonably be asked to 
consider in a single semester if they did not begin with substantial learning 
from other, earlier law school classes. 
A second generalization takes more unpacking.  Whatever specific topics 
an instructor chooses to teach, a Federal Courts course will have a number of 
uniting themes or meta-themes that Hart and Wechsler’s definition of the field 
virtually forces onto the pedagogical agenda. 
A. Separation of Powers 
Hart and Wechsler’s definition of Federal Courts as embracing the federal 
courts and the federal system recurrently brings questions involving the 
separation of powers into consideration.  These issues come in at least three 
varieties. 
First are issues involving the roles federal courts can play within the 
federal separation of powers if duly authorized, or in some cases if not 
precluded, by Congress.  Questions concerning the constitutional outer limits 
of judicial power come squarely into focus in Chapter Two, which deals with 
standing, mootness, ripeness, and political questions.  Similar issues of 
constitutionally permissible power then resurface repeatedly, including in 
chapters addressing Supreme Court review of state court judgments, federal 
common law, constitutional remedies, and sovereign and official immunity, 
among others. 
A second set of separation-of-powers issues involves the judicial role in 
determining which of the constitutionally permissible functions federal courts 
ought to perform within existing statutory frameworks.  To a large extent, the 
questions in this category are ones of statutory interpretation.  For example, 
how should the federal courts construe the myriad of statutes defining their 
jurisdiction?  Interestingly, interpretation in the Federal Courts context does 
not always follow the same precepts observed in the interpretation of other 
 
Chapter V: Review of State Court Decisions by the Supreme Court; Chapter VI: The Law 
Applied in Civil Actions in the District Courts; Chapter VII: Federal Common Law; Chapter 
VIII: The Federal Question Jurisdiction of the District Courts; Chapter IX: Suits Challenging 
Official Action; Chapter X: Judicial Federalism: Limitations on District Court Jurisdiction or Its 
Exercise; Chapter XI: Federal Habeas Corpus; Chapter XII: Advanced Problems in Judicial 
Federalism; Chapter XIII: The Diversity Jurisdiction of the Federal District Courts; Chapter XIV: 
Additional Problems of District Court Authority to Adjudicate; and Chapter XV: Obligatory and 
Discretionary Supreme Court Review.  RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. 
MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM, at xi–xiv (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. 
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statutes.  Among other things, the Supreme Court has often assumed, rightly or 
wrongly, that jurisdictional statutes should be interpreted to authorize the 
federal courts to make discretionary judgments about whether to exercise the 
jurisdiction that Congress has given them.9  Issues involving judicial discretion 
come up again and again. 
The third set of constitutional issues revolves around the roles, if any, that 
the federal courts must play in the constitutional scheme.  For example, when 
must decisions of lower courts be subject to Supreme Court review?  And are 
there some issues that federal courts, rather than state courts, must resolve?10 
B. Federalism 
Hart and Wechsler’s focus on the role of the federal courts in the federal 
system also highlights the significance of federalism within American 
constitutional and sub-constitutional law.11  Questions concerning the status of 
states as sovereigns or quasi-sovereigns stand at the fore, as do worries about 
how respect for the states and their judiciaries should affect congressional 
decisions to assign cases to the federal courts and how the federal courts 
should construe their power to issue affirmative decrees to state officials. 
Concern with federalism, and with the place of the federal courts in a 
federal system, inevitably—and in no sense ironically—makes state courts an 
important focus of a Federal Courts course.12  In most (though not all) cases, 
the alternative to adjudication by a federal court is state court determination.  
What, then, are the differences?  This is a subtle question, with both a 
constitutional and an empirical dimension.  The constitutional issues involve 
when and for what purposes the Constitution either requires state court 
adjudication in preference to federal adjudication or regards the former as an 
adequate substitute for the latter.  The empirical question is what actual, 
practical difference it is likely to make today whether a state or federal court 
decides a particular case or issue.  Are federal courts more likely to decide 
federal questions correctly or be sympathetic to claims of federal rights? 
 
 9. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 585–87 
(1985). 
 10. For a recent effort to link the principles defining what federal courts must do with those 
specifying limits on the permissible outer reaches of federal judicial power, see John Harrison, 
The Relation Between Limitations on and Requirements of Article III Adjudication, 95 CAL. L. 
REV. 1367 (2007). 
 11. For a lucid and balanced introduction to the central issues, see DAVID L. SHAPIRO, 
FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995). 
 12. Indeed, one of the three sections of Chapter IV is entitled “Federal Authority and State 
Court Jurisdiction.”  See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 383. 
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C. The Necessary Functions of Courts and Constitutionally Necessary 
Remedies 
The side-by-side examination of state and federal courts in the federal 
system invites attention to a further, more generic question about judicial 
power: When does the Constitution require that a court of some kind, state or 
federal, be available to rule on the claims of aggrieved parties?  This numbers 
among the most complex questions in constitutional law, closely linked to 
issues about constitutionally necessary remedies, which recur repeatedly in a 
Hart and Wechsler Federal Courts course.  Marbury v. Madison says that for 
every right there must be a remedy.13  But Marbury’s assertion on this point 
should occasion close analysis in the face of doctrines such as those of 
sovereign and official immunity.14 
Another complicating factor—brought to the fore by recent developments 
in the so-called war on terror—arises from decisions by Congress to employ 
non-Article III federal tribunals to resolve initially issues that could have been 
assigned to Article III courts.  Although military tribunals are the most 
controversial example at the present time, the entire system of administrative 
adjudication raises similar (though not identical) questions involving when 
Congress can employ federal adjudicative bodies other than Article III courts 
and the extent to which those bodies’ decisions can ultimately determine legal 
and constitutional rights without review—and without the opportunity for 
provision of remedies—by an Article III tribunal. 
D. The Relation Between Substance and Procedure 
It could perhaps go without saying that a recurring question in a Federal 
Courts course has to do with the relation between jurisdiction and procedure, 
on the one hand, and substantive rights, on the other.  Cases arise again and 
again in which a party has a right but has failed to invoke it in the proper court 
or has no entitlement to the particular remedy that he or she seeks.  In 
assessing such cases, a teacher must often press the question of the soundness 
of the rules under which courts deny particular remedies for the violation of 
legal and constitutional rights.  But the Hart and Wechsler materials also raise 
the question whether the remedy being sought in some cases may be so 
practically or conceptually inseparable from the right that it must be awarded if 
the claim of right is not to be nullified. 
 
 13. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803). 
 14. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1781–86 (1991). 
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E. Appropriate Techniques of Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation 
As my effort to identify some of the central themes in a Federal Courts 
course will already have made clear, many otherwise seemingly unrelated 
issues are ones of constitutional interpretation to which general theories of 
constitutional interpretation pertain.  Many others involve statutory 
interpretation and thus give relevance to general theories of statutory 
interpretation.  Issues of interpretive methodology are thus at the center of the 
kind of Federal Courts course that Hart and Wechsler invites faculty to teach. 
II.  WHY TEACH FEDERAL COURTS? 
If the challenge is put “Why is it worthwhile to teach a Federal Courts 
course?” comprising the kinds of themes and topics that I have thus far 
described, the answer seems to me to be obvious: Federal Courts offers rich 
opportunities to broaden and deepen advanced students’ understanding of 
public law. 
The strongest reservation about Federal Courts teaching that I can imagine 
rests on a false premise that the field is somehow mired inextricably in 1950s-
era Legal Process assumptions that subsequent political science has 
overthrown.  A related challenge or anxiety might be that the doctrinal focus of 
Federal Courts teaching conduces to the production of “doctrinal” or “merely 
doctrinal” scholarship that attracts and deserves disdain.  But once this critique 
is examined closely, it plausibly condemns only work that Federal Courts 
professors should not aspire to produce anyway. 
A. The Interest and Importance of the Subject Matter 
In my view, it is obvious that many if not most of the issues in a Federal 
Courts course are extremely interesting and important.  Some encompass 
aspects of Constitutional Law.  These include parts of the course focused on 
Article III, federalism, and the separation of powers. 
In addition, a pervasive Federal Courts concern involves the remedies 
through which the substantive rights studied in Constitutional Law are, and 
sometimes are not, enforced in practice.  Sovereign immunity typically bars 
direct suits against the federal and state governments for constitutional 
violations.  Damages actions against government officials often encounter 
official immunity barriers.  Surveying the doctrinal landscape, my colleague 
Daryl Levinson argues that the idea of a constitutional right cannot be 
meaningfully separated from the remedies available for the right’s 
enforcement.15  Although I would not go quite so far,16 I completely agree that 
 
 15. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 857, 858 (1999). 
 16. See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
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a study of Constitutional Law is incomplete without the critical examination of 
constitutional remedies that a Federal Courts course provides. 
In another dimension, which is almost equally important, Federal Courts is 
an advanced course in the operation of the federal judicial system.  It examines 
a host of doctrines about which future law clerks and litigators, in particular, 
ought to know. 
Moreover, in the curriculum that now exists in most law schools, many of 
the issues that form the centerpiece of a Federal Courts course would otherwise 
go largely unexamined.  For example, Constitutional Law courses already have 
enough to cover without probing deeply into issues of available remedies and 
without furnishing detailed examination of the aspects of federalism and the 
separation of powers that Federal Courts courses emphasize.  Similarly, 
although habeas corpus could be studied in Criminal Procedure rather than in 
Federal Courts, a great deal of habeas corpus law is rooted in assumptions 
about federalism that most Criminal Procedure courses do not examine.  I 
desist from offering further examples of legally important issues and doctrines 
that might otherwise go unaddressed only to avoid boring the reader further. 
A related reason to locate the issues that form the traditional core of a 
Federal Courts course in that particular offering, which draws almost 
exclusively third-year students, is that Federal Courts can presuppose 
knowledge imparted by other courses, including Constitutional Law, Civil 
Procedure, Administrative Law, and Criminal Procedure.  Students may need 
to know or learn something about bankruptcy law in order to understand issues 
involving the permissible use of non-Article III tribunals17 and the 
constitutional outer bounds of “arising under” jurisdiction.18  Leading cases on 
federal common law are easiest to grasp for those who know something about 
securities regulation.19  As I said earlier, Federal Courts functions as a capstone 
course in which students revisit a number of issues that they have encountered 
previously when the best students are ready to go further and deeper. 
Finally, what I described above as the themes or meta-themes that run 
through the course are valuable ones for students to trace through a variety of 
legal doctrines.  Unanticipated connections frequently emerge; doctrines that 
look discrete on the surface can often be fitted together like pieces of a puzzle.  
 
 17. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51–55 (1989) (discussing Congress’s 
power “to commit adjudication of a statutory cause of action to a non-Article III bankruptcy 
court”); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (plurality 
opinion) (holding that the Bankruptcy Reform Act’s broad grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy 
courts violates Article III). 
 18. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 470–78 (1957) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting) (discussing possible explanations of how bankruptcy disputes “aris[e] under” 
federal law). 
 19. See, e.g., Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286 (1993); 
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
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When this is so, students may come to understand how the correct resolution of 
an issue under one doctrinal rubric depends on considerations more commonly 
located under another. 
To take what seems to me the plainest example, questions involving the 
constitutionality of congressional withdrawals of judicial jurisdiction may 
depend on whether the parties who would like to bring suit have a substantive 
constitutional right to the remedy that they seek, and whether they have a right 
to a particular remedy may be bound up with doctrines of sovereign and 
official immunity.20  In other words, questions arising under doctrines 
involving jurisdiction-stripping may get their answers from doctrines involving 
substantive rights and sovereign and official immunity.  (The point about 
doctrinal interconnection would hold equally if the arrow of causal influence 
should run in the other direction.) 
Another illustration of doctrinal connection comes from habeas corpus 
doctrine.  Whether federal habeas corpus relief should be available to a 
prisoner convicted by a state court may depend partly on whether the Supreme 
Court would have had jurisdiction to review the underlying conviction—a 
question settled by what appears on the surface to be a wholly unrelated 
doctrine.21  If the state court committed no constitutional error that would have 
been reviewable by the Supreme Court, then it is difficult to say that the 
conviction was unlawful—even if, for example, the criminal defendant either 
knowingly or unwittingly waived a constitutional right that he or she would 
later like to claim.  Or perhaps federal habeas review of state court convictions 
ought to serve a different function from that of backing up the Supreme Court.  
In either case, knowledge of one doctrine—that governing the availability of 
Supreme Court review, for example—may often illuminate another, such as 
habeas corpus. 
One more example may suffice to illustrate the point.  Champions of 
constitutional federalism frequently defend the view that federal courts ought 
not interfere with pending proceedings in state courts and administrative 
agencies.  They assert that state courts, in particular, should be presumed as 
good as federal courts.22  But if respect for state courts depends on the premise 
that state courts should be presumed as competent as federal courts, hard 
questions arise about whether the Supreme Court should identify and enforce a 
 
 20. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 332–38 (1993); Hart, supra note 4, at 1370–
71. 
 21. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 1281–82. 
 22. For discussion of this view and its familiar location in a “Federalist” model of thought 
about Federal Courts issues, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 
VA. L. REV. 1141 (1988). 
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variety of constitutional and statutory obligations against state courts in order 
to ensure that reality aligns reasonably well with the premise.23 
To summarize: A reason to teach Federal Courts is that the course exposes 
students to much that is interesting and important and that the students are 
unlikely to learn anywhere else in the law school curriculum.  Students can 
learn a great deal, and professors can help students to deepen their 
understanding of public law, even if nothing profound ever emerges. 
B. A Misplaced Objection 
When I try to reconstruct the more sophisticated version of the “Why teach 
Federal Courts?” challenge, I must suppose that it reflects the assumption—
which I believe to be common—that little, if any, fundamental 
reconceptualization has occurred in Federal Courts scholarship since Henry 
Hart and Herbert Wechsler published their first edition in 1953, and that 
teaching and scholarship in the field must therefore subsist in stagnation. 
This objection takes a little unpacking.  As I have come to understand it, it 
reflects four assumptions. 
First, Hart and Wechsler pioneered the so-called Legal Process School, 
which reflected cutting-edge thinking about public law in the 1950s.24 
Second, Hart and Wechsler, in common with the Legal Process School 
more generally, were centrally concerned with issues of institutional 
competence regarding which branches of government should have ultimate 
responsibility for resolving particular kinds of questions.  As did others in the 
Legal Process School, Hart and Wechsler further assumed that issues of 
institutional competence should be regarded as distinguishable from the 
substantive merits of particular disputes. 
Third, following in Hart and Wechsler’s Legal Process footsteps, much 
Federal Courts scholarship continues to be preoccupied with issues involving 
the appropriate assignment of decision-making responsibilities to federal 
courts, state courts, or other institutions. 
Fourth, Federal Courts scholarship and teaching thus remain rooted in Hart 
and Wechsler’s Legal Process methodology25 and must, therefore, have failed 
to make the kind of intellectual progress that has occurred in other fields, often 
through utilization of more sophisticated tools of analysis, many of them 
interdisciplinary, that have emerged since the 1950s. 
 
 23. See id. 
 24. On the Legal Process School, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An 
Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. 
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at 
li–cxxxvi (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); Fallon, supra note 1 at 963–
64. 
 25. I once suggested so myself.  See Fallon, supra note 1, at 954–56. 
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In my view, the first three of these assumptions are correct, but the 
fourth—which is framed as a conclusion—does not follow, or at least does not 
follow necessarily.  In order to see why, it is important to distinguish between 
the questions of comparative institutional competence that Hart and Wechsler 
framed and the techniques of analysis through which they sought answers to 
those questions.  To be more concrete, the themes and questions that Hart and 
Wechsler put at the center of The Federal Courts and the Federal System 
continue to be themes and questions that any student of American public law 
ought to think hard about. 
As should be clear from what I have said already, however, to assert the 
continuing relevance of the central themes and questions of a Hart and 
Wechsler Federal Courts course is not to say that Henry Hart and Herbert 
Wechsler answered all of their legendary questions correctly.  It is not even to 
say that Hart and Wechsler pointed students and teachers in the right directions 
to seek answers.  With respect to these matters, many of the original authors’ 
1950s-vintage assumptions, reflecting the teachings of then-current political 
science, may indeed be dated. 
But, crucially, there is no obstacle to Federal Courts professors today 
pursuing the themes that Hart and Wechsler put at the course’s center with any 
of the intellectual resources that are available in the twenty-first century.  Class 
discussions about how to interpret statutes and the Constitution should reflect 
the best current theories of statutory and constitutional interpretation.  Analysis 
of issues of federalism and the separation of powers should draw on the most 
up-to-date and sophisticated political scientific studies.  Examinations of the 
relationship between substance and procedure should take account of relevant 
recent scholarship in philosophy, political science, and psychology.  When 
history is relevant, we should be conversant with, and tell our students about, 
the best historical studies. 
In making these claims, I am sketching an ideal of Federal Courts teaching, 
and by implication of Federal Courts scholarship, of which all of us who work 
in the field inevitably fall short to one or another degree.  Yet I have no 
difficulty in identifying first-rate work about Federal Courts topics that is 
expressly interdisciplinary or otherwise employs cutting-edge research or 
analytical techniques.  Examples include Nancy King’s empirical study of 
habeas corpus cases filed by state prisoners since the Anti-Terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996;26 Eugene Kontorovich’s economics-
driven examination of alternative remedial regimes for constitutional 
 
 26. NANCY J. KING, FRED K. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM, FINAL TECHNICAL 
REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS 
CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE 
DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (2007), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf. 
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violations, including intentional and ongoing deprivations of liberty;27 
Maxwell Stearns’s application of public choice theory to illuminate standing 
law issues;28 and a historical study by Ted White and Paul Halliday on the 
extra-territorial reach of English habeas corpus jurisdiction.29  I also know 
from conversation that many, many Federal Courts teachers bring the insights 
of other disciplines into their teaching. 
C. An Aside on Doctrinalism 
A related anxiety that may afflict some Federal Courts teachers involves 
scholarship more than teaching, but it is one that my discussion so far may 
have done more to heighten than to alleviate.  This is the worry that Federal 
Courts is such an intensely doctrinal course that absorption in its subject 
matter may conduce to, even if it of course does not force, the production of 
doctrinal scholarship.  Without attempting a systematic study, I would guess 
that the proportion of doctrinal to non-doctrinal Federal Courts scholarship is 
very high, and I would further speculate that the intricacy of Federal Courts 
doctrine may tend to pull those who must master it in a scholarly direction that 
emphasizes doctrinal exposition and analysis. 
There is undoubtedly a belief among some in the legal academy today that 
doctrinal scholarship—or “merely doctrinal” scholarship, as I often hear it 
labeled—is somehow retrograde or unworthy.  In my view, however, the label 
“doctrinal” is almost maddeningly imprecise.  When even a modicum of 
precision is achieved, I doubt that most of those who employ the label as a 
pejorative would wish to apply it to all cases that it might fit descriptively. 
In thinking about doctrinal scholarship, I assume that nearly all modern 
law professors, including those who see their work as doctrinal, would agree 
that their scholarly writing should be judged by two overriding criteria.  First, 
is what they say true or accurate?  Second, is it illuminating, fresh, or 
surprising to those who already know something about the subject matter and 
satisfy reasonably high standards of intellectual sophistication? 
If these two criteria are accepted, then much scholarship that could fairly 
be characterized as doctrinal undoubtedly registers low on the quality scale.  
Many articles summarizing and analyzing judicial opinions and lines of cases 
say little to advance the understanding of those who already know the relevant 
law and previously extant literature. 
 
 27. Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass 
Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 755, 758–61 (2004). 
 28. Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 
CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1329–85 (1995). 
 29. Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial 
Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575 (2008). 
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Plainly, however, to say that a lot of scholarship devoted to analyzing 
cases and doctrine fails to qualify as illuminating does not by itself establish a 
quality-based contrast with interdisciplinary writing.  Much of the scholarship 
that examines legal issues through the lens of other disciplines either labors the 
obvious, rests on unrealistic assumptions, or operates at a level of abstraction 
too far removed from actual legal problems to provide useful guidance to 
anyone. 
Furthermore, to point out the banality of some or even much doctrinal 
scholarship is not to demonstrate that no work of that genre makes an 
intellectual contribution.  To the contrary, it is almost self-evidently possible 
for scholarship analyzing legal doctrines to generate fresh insights by exposing 
previously unrecognized patterns, connections, assumptions, implications, 
tensions, symmetries, or asymmetries.  Some contributions will be larger, some 
smaller, and the value of particular works of doctrinal scholarship will vary 
accordingly.  But if our ambition as law professors is to advance understanding 
of law and legal processes, it would be almost foolishly self-defeating to rule 
out the possibility that we might gain a better understanding through close 
attention to legal reasoning and legal doctrine. 
I think it is for this reason that when I hear work derided as “doctrinal,” the 
word “doctrinal” is typically preceded, either implicitly or explicitly, by the 
adverb “merely.”  The critics mean to dismiss not all work that analyzes legal 
reasoning and doctrine, but only scholarship that is “merely doctrinal.”  The 
qualifier signifies recognition that when a scholar has come to a deep 
understanding of a body of law or the relation of one doctrine to another, 
methodologies or insights drawn from other disciplines may drive the most 
interesting conclusions.  For example, a scholar may find that a doctrine 
reflects the characteristic assumptions of particular schools of moral 
philosophy,30 or has evolved in ways that only a complex analysis connecting 
legal with political or social history can bring to light,31 or embodies tensions 
that may be deeply rooted in human psychology.32 
Indeed, it seems to me ineluctable that scholars whose education and 
reading have equipped them to achieve insights made possible by knowledge 
of other disciplines are comparatively advantaged over scholars who are less 
learned.  Accordingly, I would think it woefully misguided for Federal Courts 
 
 30. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967) (assessing the “rules 
of decision” used by courts to determine “just compensation” in Takings Clause cases in light of 
utilitarian and fairness-based conceptions of justice). 
 31. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 
(1977). 
 32. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. 
REV. 205, 211–17 (1979). 
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scholars or those in any other field to disparage interdisciplinary analysis.  I 
mean only to insist it would be at least equally wrongheaded to look 
disdainfully on legal scholarship that begins with close attention to legal 
doctrines—that is, with all work that is doctrinal in focus, as opposed to 
“merely doctrinal.” 
Moreover, even within the category of “merely doctrinal” scholarship—
defined for the moment as work that does not draw heavily on the 
methodologies of or conclusions generated within other disciplines—I have 
little difficulty identifying works that are almost universally regarded as being 
of highest quality.  Within the fields of Constitutional Law and Constitutional 
Theory, which virtually no one takes to be intellectually backward, examples 
come from such books as Alexander Bickel’s The Least Dangerous Branch33 
and John Hart Ely’s Democracy and Distrust,34 and from such articles as 
Sandy Levinson’s The Embarrassing Second Amendment35 and Larry Sager’s 
Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms.36  As 
these examples may help to establish, the value of at least some doctrinal 
scholarship in advancing understanding of particular areas of law seems 
practically indisputable. 
This conclusion prompts me to think that a large majority of those who 
speak derisively of “doctrinal” scholarship really mean to refer only to 
“doctrinal scholarship that consists mostly of doctrinal summary and generates 
few if any fresh or surprising insights.”  If, however, the critique of doctrinal 
scholarship were expressed in these terms, then no Federal Courts teacher or 
scholar should feel anxious on grounds distinctively related to subject matter, 
and none should take umbrage.  Others in the legal academy, as well as others 
in Federal Courts, are surely entitled to demand that we who write in the field 
should produce insightful scholarship and that, in order to do so, we should be 
reasonably conversant with developments in some of the fields of study that 
might illuminate our own.  We cannot claim simultaneously that Federal 
Courts is not an intellectual backwater and that the nature of the field somehow 
exempts us from generally applicable standards of scholarly excellence. 
Overall, I am thus inclined to believe that those of us producing Federal 
Courts scholarship ought not in any event to be doing the kind of work to 
which the derisory characterization “merely doctrinal” fairly applies.  And if 
we are not doing such work, but are instead advancing analyses that others 
 
 33. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). 
 34. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
 35. Sanford Levinson, The Embarassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989). 
 36. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). 
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within the field view as illuminating, then we should make no apologies that 
our inquiries often begin with a close examination of Federal Courts doctrine. 
III.  HOW TO TEACH FEDERAL COURTS 
There is no single right or best way to teach Federal Courts.  How to do so 
is a matter of individual judgment, interest, taste, and vision.  Without pretense 
of prescribing for everyone, in this section I shall offer a few personal 
judgments about matters that bear emphasis in teaching some of the topics that 
the course comprises. 
A. Hart and Wechsler Chapter II: Cases and Controversies 
Although I have never had time to teach all of the materials on cases and 
controversies, the question of what constitutes a justiciable case lies at the 
conceptual core of a Federal Courts course. 
1. Marbury v. Madison 
Although students will already have read Marbury v. Madison37 in 
Constitutional Law, it bears re-examination in Federal Courts.  As Henry 
Monaghan has pointed out, Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion includes at least 
two strands that usefully frame debates about the judicial role.38  First, there is 
a “private rights” strand, which roots the exercise of judicial review in the 
courts’ power and obligation to resolve concrete disputes between particular 
parties.39  Under Marbury’s private rights rationale, judicial review is a 
necessary incident of adjudication in cases in which the Constitution furnishes 
a rule of decision; the courts have no special, more general charge to 
pronounce on constitutional matters when traditional or “private” rights are not 
at stake.40  Second, from Marbury’s insistence that it is the function of the 
courts “to say what the law is,”41 it is possible to tease out a view of courts as 
having what Monaghan calls the “special function” of pronouncing on 
constitutional meaning for the benefit of the public as a whole.42 
Marbury’s strands emphasizing the judicial role in vindicating individual 
rights and in saying “what the law is” provide useful lenses for examining 
controverted standing cases.  In Flast v. Cohen43 and Allen v. Wright,44 for 
 
 37. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 38. See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 
1363, 1365–71 (1973). 
 39. Id. at 1365–66. 
 40. Id. at 1366–67. 
 41. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. 
 42. See, e.g., Monaghan supra note 38, at 1368–71 (introducing the “special function” model 
of the judicial role). 
 43. 392 U.S. 83, 99–102 (1968). 
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example, one can ask whether the plaintiffs suffered a sufficiently palpable 
harm to qualify for standing under Marbury’s “private rights” strand or 
whether justiciability rules should permit judicial involvement whenever a 
constitutional violation has allegedly occurred and no other plaintiff exists 
whose personal rights or interests are more directly affected. 
Beyond Marbury’s “private rights” and “special functions” strands the 
case, in my view, has a third, generative aspect that emerges from examination 
of its political context.  In Marbury and the contemporaneous case of Stuart v. 
Laird,45 the Supreme Court found itself in a political context in which a ruling 
for the plaintiffs would have produced disastrous consequences for the Article 
III judiciary: The newly elected Jeffersonians would not only have refused to 
obey decisions against them, but also would likely have retaliated by 
eviscerating the power and independence of the Judicial Branch.46  If this 
consideration influenced the Court’s decisions—and there is good reason to 
believe that it did—then Marbury, which is the fountainhead for modern 
understandings of judicial review, also exhibits what I have called a 
“prudential face.”47 
The idea that the Court might occasionally depart from principles of strict 
legality in the service of what it takes to be higher, long-term, prudential goals 
is an important one for students to consider in a number of doctrinal areas.  
Viewing that idea as traceable to Marbury may give it respectability that it 
otherwise would lack.  Among other things, the notion that the Supreme Court 
might sometimes behave “politically” or “prudentially” may problematize easy 
student assumptions that Congress should not be able to limit the jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court because otherwise politics would prevail over law.  
Focus on Marbury’s prudential aspect may also enrich thinking about the 
political question doctrine and about the propriety of judicial decisions 
claiming discretion to decline to exercise congressionally conferred 
jurisdiction. 
2. Standing 
Although the Supreme Court has built a body of standing jurisprudence 
with the concept of “injury-in-fact” at its core, it is almost child’s play to show 
that the Court’s standards for defining “injury” are pliable at best, manipulable 
at worst.  In my experience, it risks demoralizing students to ask them to work 
 
 44. 468 U.S. 737, 751–52 (1984). 
 45. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). 
 46. On the political context of Marbury, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE 
FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 
147–49 (2005). 
 47. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay 
on the Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5, 16–18 (2003). 
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carefully through a sequence of intricately reasoned decisions only to generate 
the conclusion that the Court’s pattern of analyses exhibits no coherence or 
integrity.  For me, standing classes go better when I offer students an 
alternative framework.  In articles that I find wholly persuasive, William 
Fletcher and Cass Sunstein have argued that the appropriate question in 
standing cases is not whether the plaintiff can demonstrate injury, but whether 
the plaintiff has pleaded a violation of his or her rights for which some 
provision of substantive law provides an entitlement to relief.48  On this view, 
the question of standing essentially reduces to whether the plaintiff has a cause 
of action. 
If standing cases are re-conceptualized as involving whether particular 
plaintiffs have alleged rights violations for which the substantive law affords a 
right to redress, it becomes possible to make sense of the dizzying pattern of 
outcomes in standing cases as reflecting judgments about what rights plaintiffs 
do and do not have under the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses, for 
example.  In Allen v. Wright,49 for instance, the central question is not whether 
the parents of black school children have suffered a stigmatic injury from the 
failure of the Internal Revenue Service to deny tax benefits to racially 
discriminatory private schools, but whether the Equal Protection Clause gives 
those parents a right to have the government enforce the tax laws aggressively 
against third parties.  This seems to me to be a question of excruciating 
difficulty, and many students who would otherwise be strongly disposed to 
support standing react similarly.  When the issue is framed this way, it 
becomes easy to see why the Justices might divide largely along ideological 
lines, reflecting competing views of whether the Constitution would sensibly 
afford the plaintiffs a cause of action.  By contrast, it is less easy to see why the 
Justices might so divide over what purports to be the factual question of 
whether the plaintiff has suffered an “injury.” 
A further point about the standing cases seems to me to be equally 
important.  Students should understand that parties claiming invasion of 
common law liberty and property interests always have standing.50  The result 
is an important asymmetry in cases arising from governmental regulation of 
private conduct: whereas the targets of governmental regulation invariably 
have standing to challenge the lawfulness of the limitations imposed on them, 
regulatory beneficiaries frequently encounter acute standing problems when 
they sue to enforce statutory mandates (such as environmental legislation).  
Students should be made to think about whether this disparity inheres in the 
 
 48. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223 (1988); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1474–75 
(1988). 
 49. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
 50. See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 1439–40. 
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constitutional structure.  Does the Constitution, by making it difficult for the 
federal government to legislate, privilege those who wish to maintain the pre-
regulatory status quo?  Or is current standing doctrine the reflection of a 
largely conservative ideology that judges and Justices have imposed on the 
Constitution? 
A final thematic point to make about standing doctrine involves the 
connections among rights, justiciability, and remedies.  I think it is no accident 
that many of the most controverted standing cases in the Supreme Court have 
involved fact patterns in which plaintiffs ask a court to compel executive 
branch officials to enforce the law against a third party (Allen v. Wright, which 
I briefly discussed above, exemplifies cases fitting this mold).  In these cases, 
there seems to me to be a real question (however the question should 
ultimately be resolved) of whether the remedy sought—a federal judicial 
intervention into executive decisions about how and against whom to enforce 
the law—should be forbidden or at least presumptively disfavored, under the 
separation of powers.  In O’Shea v. Littleton,51 the Court acknowledged that 
considerations bearing on whether plaintiffs have satisfied the case-or-
controversy requirement sometimes “shade into those determining whether the 
complaint states a sound basis for equitable relief.”52  In my view, the 
phenomenon of remedial concerns influencing justiciability determinations is 
more widespread than has usually been recognized.53 
B. Hart and Wechsler Chapter IV: Congressional Control of Jurisdiction 
1. Restrictions on Federal Court Jurisdiction 
Against the background of historically broad grants of federal jurisdiction, 
the central topics for discussion in a unit on congressional regulatory power 
concern jurisdiction-stripping legislation enacted in response to judicial 
decisions with which Congress disagrees—for example, proposed legislation 
purporting to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain challenges to 
the constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance.  For purposes of 
constitutional analysis, the precise form of jurisdiction-stripping legislation 
may matter enormously.  The first task in teaching congressional control of 
federal jurisdiction is thus to insist on the importance of “thinking like a 
lawyer” by parsing out the issues along at least two dimensions.  First, be clear 
exactly what limitation on federal jurisdiction is under consideration.  Different 
issues arise under different language of Article III depending on whether 
Congress (i) is withdrawing federal district court jurisdiction while retaining 
 
 51. 414 U.S. 488 (1974). 
 52. Id. at 499. 
 53. This is a central theme of Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and 
Remedies—And Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633 (2006). 
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Supreme Court jurisdiction to review state court decisions,54 (ii) is 
withdrawing Supreme Court jurisdiction while leaving district court 
jurisdiction in place,55 or (iii) is withdrawing all federal jurisdiction while the 
state courts remain open. 
Second, it is important to identify the possible bases for constitutional 
challenges to jurisdiction-stripping.  Analysis conventionally starts with Article 
III, but due process and equal protection arguments also may be available.  
Equal protection challenges in particular may raise complex questions about 
how to integrate the original understanding of Article III with bodies of 
constitutional law—such as those enforcing equal protection norms against the 
federal government—that have no basis in founding-era understandings. 
Issues of interpretive theory thus assume large importance, and teachers 
should deal with those issues in sophisticated terms.  With respect to Article 
III, the Hart and Wechsler casebook emphasizes the Madisonian Compromise 
at the Constitutional Convention, which gave Congress the option whether or 
not to create any lower federal courts at all.56  But it is worth considering 
whether issues involving congressional control of federal jurisdiction are ones 
on which the original understanding of Article III ought to be dispositive.  And 
even if that is the case, there may be pertinent historical evidence besides the 
Madisonian Compromise.  For example, Akhil Amar has provided historical 
and textual support for Justice Story’s thesis57 that the Constitution requires 
that some federal court have either original or appellate jurisdiction in all cases 
arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.58  The 
evidence on this point is contested,59 but it is an important question of 
constitutional theory—well worth discussing in this context—how courts 
should respond to less than wholly conclusive evidence regarding the original 
constitutional understanding. 
In my experience, students typically recoil at the notion that Congress 
might be able to manipulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts for “political” 
ends.  But the behavior of the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison suggests 
that courts, too, can sometimes act strategically.  In a post-Realist world, 
nearly everyone acknowledges that the Justices’ ideological outlooks influence 
 
 54. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448–49 (1850). 
 55. Cf. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512–14 (1868) (holding that the 
Constitution’s “express words” give Congress the power to make exceptions and to regulate the 
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction). 
 56. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 7–9. 
 57. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 331 (1816). 
 58. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of 
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985). 
 59. For searching criticism of Amar’s central conclusions, see Daniel J. Meltzer, The History 
and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1585–1608 (1990). 
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their views about constitutional issues.60  Students should be challenged to 
consider whether Realist and post-Realist insights are pertinent to issues 
involving congressional control of federal jurisdiction. 
2. Simultaneous Restrictions on State and Federal Court Jurisdiction 
Suppose Congress purported to strip the jurisdiction of all courts—state as 
well as federal—to rule on particular claims of violations of constitutional 
rights (as, for example, in challenges to the constitutionality of the Pledge of 
Allegiance).  If Congress could preclude all courts from ruling on assertions of 
constitutional rights violations, it could leverage its power over jurisdiction 
into a power to nullify rights—a conclusion against which Henry Hart 
protested vehemently in his magisterial Dialogue.61  As I have noted already, 
however, it will not suffice to establish the unconstitutionality of jurisdiction-
stripping schemes simply to insist that for every rights violation plaintiffs are 
entitled to a fully efficacious remedy: The doctrines of sovereign and official 
immunity, which are well entrenched, frequently deny plaintiffs the only 
remedies that would make them “whole.”  In attempting to reconcile his theory 
that Congress cannot use its power over jurisdiction to eviscerate rights with 
historically settled doctrine, Professor Hart relied heavily on the notion of the 
“substitutability” of remedies: Although plaintiffs may have no right to their 
preferred remedy, there must at least be some remedy available to them when 
their rights are violated and, thus, some court with jurisdiction to provide a 
remedy.62  But whether this suggestion will hold up doctrinally may depend on 
the scope historically accorded to sovereign and official immunity. 
The complexities attending these doctrines are vast.  No student could sort 
them all out in an initial pass at issues involving the relationships among 
rights, jurisdiction that may be subject to limitation, and remedies.  
Nevertheless, students should begin to see how issues of congressional power 
to limit judicial jurisdiction are bound up with issues involving constitutionally 
necessary remedies.63 
The great text on these matters remains Hart’s Dialogue, originally 
published in 1953.64  Anyone struggling with the deepest issues surrounding 
executive and congressional efforts to limit judicial review of executive 
detentions in post-9/11 cases arising from the war on terror would hunt in vain 
for a richer analysis. 
 
 60. That courts are strategic or ideologically motivated actors is a staple in much modern 
political science literature.  For a survey by a law professor and Federal Courts teacher, see Barry 
Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257 (2005). 
 61. Hart, supra note 4, at 1371. 
 62. See id. at 1366–70. 
 63. For a more in-depth discussion, see Fallon, supra note 20. 
 64. See Hart, supra note 4. 
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3. Congressional Reliance on Non-Article III Federal Tribunals 
Although many Federal Courts teachers skip the materials involving non-
Article III adjudicative bodies such as legislative courts and administrative 
agencies, I do not.  Administrative adjudication plays an enormous role in 
modern American law.  As Judith Resnik has maintained, a Federal Courts 
course that turns a blind eye to administrative adjudication conveys an almost 
inherently misleading impression of the role of the Article III courts in the 
modern federal system.65 
The doctrines bearing on permissible uses of legislative courts and 
administrative agencies are extraordinarily complex, but students will have 
some relevant background from Administrative Law.  It is therefore possible 
not only to analyze the leading cases but also to focus on larger themes.  For 
example, can the schemes of administrative adjudication that characterize the 
modern administrative state be reconciled with the original constitutional 
understanding?  And if not, is it tenable to treat the original understanding as 
dispositive of some questions involving congressional power to control 
jurisdiction (such as those supposedly governed by the Madisonian 
Compromise) but not others?  At the most general level, my own view is that 
when the original understanding can be identified, courts should follow it in 
the absence of sufficiently good reason not to do so—and that sufficiently 
good reason exists in the case of the modern administrative state.66 
When issues involving administrative adjudication arise in a course in 
Administrative Law, the surrounding context lends an aura of inevitability to 
sharp limits on the role of Article III courts.  In Administrative Law, the 
agencies occupy center stage. Viewed from the perspective of Article III, 
adjudication by agencies charged with implementing policy goals can appear a 
good deal more problematic.  There is much to be learned about legal and 
constitutional evolution from the accommodation that has developed between 
Article III and the modern administrative state. 
In an article published twenty years ago, I argued that the constitutional 
validity of schemes of administrative adjudication should depend on the 
availability of sufficiently searching appellate review by an Article III court.67  
The article’s principal claim of constitutional theory was that administrative 
adjudication can be made consistent with, rather than treated as an exception 
to, Article III’s guarantees of disinterested adjudication by independent 
judges—which, I argued, can come on appellate review as well as through the 
exercise of original jurisdiction.  My ambition in that article was to rationalize 
much of the existing doctrinal framework while suggesting judicially 
 
 65. See Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 842 (1984). 
 66. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article 
III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988). 
 67. See id. at 933, 944. 
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enforceable limits on possible future developments.  Since then, I have 
sometimes worried that scholarship trying to rationalize existing bodies of 
doctrine casts the author in the role of apologist for the law as it is.  Yet it also 
seems to me that the central art of lawyers and judges is to impose patterns that 
show cases in a normatively attractive light and that indicate how the norms 
that best rationalize them ought to be extended into the future.68  Students 
might usefully be asked to respond to this claim in assessing the 
constitutionality of a federal scheme that substitutes legislative courts or 
administrative agencies for Article III courts. 
C. Hart and Wechsler Chapter V: Review of State Court Decisions by the 
Supreme Court 
Although complexity is omnipresent, the leading cases of Martin v. 
Hunter’s Lessee69 and Murdock v. Memphis70 nicely embed the central 
premises of constitutional federalism in a post-Erie71 legal universe: The 
Supreme Court of the United States can review state court decisions of federal 
law, and pronounce conclusions that thereafter bind the state courts, but the 
Supreme Court ordinarily cannot review state court rulings on state law 
questions, concerning which state courts are the highest authorities.  To 
students, the conclusions of Martin and Murdock tend to seem obvious, the 
alternative results unimaginable.  I try to inject interest by asking students to 
imagine the different pictures of constitutional federalism that the losing 
parties in those cases presented.  How would the constitutional system work if 
there could be no Supreme Court review of state court judgments?  (At the 
least, there would be enormous pressure on Congress to expand the jurisdiction 
of the lower federal courts and to give them exclusive jurisdiction in more 
cases.  But without Supreme Court review, how would mandates of federal 
exclusivity be enforced?)  And would it be a sensible, or even a 
constitutionally permissible, state of affairs for the Supreme Court routinely to 
review state court rulings on state law issues? 
Against the background of the conceptually elegant framework that the 
conjunction of Martin and Murdock creates, nearly all of the interesting 
questions about Supreme Court review of state court judgments involve how to 
identify controlling legal norms as either federal or state in character.  Many of 
 
 68. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225–38 (1986) (arguing that legal interpretation 
aims to cast legal materials in the best normative light). 
 69. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 351–52 (1816). 
 70. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 626–27 (1874). 
 71. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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these questions turn out to be surprisingly difficult and surprisingly 
interesting,72 though I seldom have time to delve into many of them. 
D. Hart and Wechsler Chapter VII: Federal Common Law 
Many students fail to understand why Erie’s banishment of the specious 
category of “federal general common law”—the “brooding omnipresence in 
the sky”73 that was neither federal law binding on state courts under the 
Supremacy Clause, nor state law to be applied by federal courts under the 
Federal Rules of Decision Act74—did not sound the death knell for all federal 
common law.  The conceptual explanation comes readily: The “real” federal 
common law that endures today, although judge-made, is federal law binding 
on state courts under the Supremacy Clause. 
Once real, post-Erie federal common law is distinguished conceptually 
from the spurious pre-Erie “federal general common law,” the daunting task is 
to figure out when it is constitutionally permissible and appropriate for federal 
courts to craft federal common law in light of principles of federalism and the 
separation of powers.  An earlier generation of legal scholars, under the 
influence of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks’s famous Legal Process materials, 
suggested that federal courts properly crafted federal common law to promote 
the “purposes” manifested by the federal Constitution and federal statutes.75  
By contrast, recent “public choice” literature debunks the notion of statutory 
purposes that are imagined to stand independent of enacted statutory 
language.76  The Public Choice school instead views all legislation as the 
product of bargains or tradeoffs among interest groups that are embodied in 
enacted statutory language.  From this perspective, federal common law that 
purports to implement statutory purposes instead upsets the terms of the 
explicit compromises that statutory language inevitably reflects and gives some 
party or coalition more than it could achieve in the legislature. 
Although the Legal Process and Public Choice schools disagree about 
nearly all else, they concur that the nature of the legislative process has 
important implications for judicial judgments about whether to craft federal 
common law (as well as about how to interpret statutes).  Accordingly, it is 
impossible to teach about federal common law without testing old Legal 
Process ideas against modern public choice scholarship and without 
introducing more recent theories of statutory interpretation and the legislative 
 
 72. The classic study remains Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relation Between State and Federal 
Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV.  489 (1954). 
 73. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 74. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (originally enacted as section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789). 
 75. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 24, at c–cxxxiv. 
 76. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 1 (1991) (providing an explication of public choice theory). 
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process that might justify a continued, substantial role for federal common 
lawmaking.77  In my experience, students divide deeply in their reaction to 
public choice theory’s portrayal of statutes as reflecting deals that courts 
should not revise, but nearly all agree that public choice theory presents 
challenges that educated lawyers and judges need to confront.  Many want 
help. 
A further challenge to the teacher is to explore whether federal courts do 
and should have a different role in crafting federal common law to implement 
constitutional values than in developing federal common law under federal 
statutes.  The founding generation almost certainly expected the courts to 
implement the Constitution through a scheme of common law remedies78—but 
in a pre-Erie conceptual universe in which it was apparently not understood (as 
it is today) that law is necessarily the product of some duly authorized state or 
federal lawmaker.  Among the issues to be explored is how the movement 
from pre- to post-Erie jurisprudential assumptions may have affected the 
relationship between constitutional rights and constitutional remedies: Does 
the idea of a constitutional right, as it has been understood in our tradition, 
imply a legitimate judicial authority to craft remedies that are necessary or 
appropriate to vindicate the right?  My own view is that it does.79 
E. Hart and Wechsler Chapter VIII: The Federal Question Jurisdiction of the 
District Courts 
Article III authorizes federal jurisdiction of cases “arising under” the 
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.80  This language generates 
subtle questions concerning the outer limits of congressional power to confer 
federal jurisdiction.  But students, in my experience, have a tendency to view 
those questions as abstract and inconsequential, perhaps because Congress, 
since Osborn v. Bank of United States81 and the companion Planters’ Bank 
case,82 has not often pushed into doubtful territory.83  (It is for this reason that 
the Supreme Court has never pronounced squarely on the validity of theories 
defending congressional power to confer “protective jurisdiction.”)  In order to 
keep students focused, I follow two tracks.  First, I press the students to 
identify reasons why, as a practical matter, anyone should care if Congress 
 
 77. See Introductory Note on the Existence, Sources, and Scope of Federal Common Law, in 
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 616–26. 
 78. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 14, at 1779–87. 
 79. See id. 
 80. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 81. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
 82. Bank of the U.S. v. Planters’ Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824). 
 83. This is not of course to say that it has never done so.  See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. 
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) (upholding the constitutionality of the jurisdiction 
conferred by § 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act). 
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could confer federal jurisdiction in all cases in which it wished to do so.  
Second, I force the students to develop arguments about whether hypothetical 
statutes (that I distribute in advance) would or would not be constitutionally 
permissible. 
A number of jurisdictional statutes, centrally including 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 
employ the same language as Article III in conferring federal jurisdiction over 
actions “arising under” the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.  
Despite the identity of language, the Supreme Court has consistently construed 
those statutes to stop short of the Constitution’s outer bounds—almost surely 
for reasons involving the Court’s sense of sound jurisdictional policy: The 
Court does not think it prudent for the lower courts to exercise a statutory 
jurisdiction as broad as the Constitution would permit.  In teaching the scope 
of statutory “arising under” jurisdiction, I thus begin by discussing issues of 
sensible jurisdictional policy, issues of the judicial role in construing 
jurisdictional statutes that the Court might think unwisely drafted, and their 
relation to one another. 
Then, to provide an intellectual framework within which to discuss the 
leading cases, I emphasize that the principal dialectic within the Supreme 
Court has involved competing claims for a rule-like and a standard-like 
approach to the determination of jurisdiction over particular cases.  Rules—
sharp, clear, easily administered prescriptions for inclusion or exclusion of 
cases—promote certainty and predictability but are inherently over- or under-
inclusive as measured against their underlying purposes.84  Standards—vaguer 
formulations that call for more judgment in application—would in principle 
yield more fine-grained judgments of appropriateness, but may lead to 
uncertainty and inconsistency in practice.  Third-year students will have 
encountered debates about the comparative merits of rules and standards in 
other courses.85  A brief review enhances understanding both of the doctrinal 
framework for determining “arising under” jurisdiction and of the general 
conceptual distinction between rules and standards. 
F. Hart and Wechsler Chapter IX: Suits Challenging Official Action 
1. Federal Sovereign Immunity 
The idea of sovereign immunity deserves both a historical and a conceptual 
introduction.  What is a sovereign?  Why might it be thought that a sovereign 
should not be suable without its consent?  In the framework of American 
 
 84. On the nature of rules, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES (1991). 
 85. The rules-standards dichotomy has enormous explanatory value in private as well as in 
public law contexts.  On rules and standards in private law, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). 
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constitutionalism, who or what—if anyone or anything—should be regarded as 
a sovereign? 
In American constitutional history, the government of the United States 
has long possessed sovereign immunity from unconsented suits, but citizens 
have often, indeed typically, been able to enforce rights against the government 
by suing the individual officers through whom the government acts86—as is 
illustrated by, and can be drawn out in a discussion of, the leading case of 
United States v. Lee.87  When sovereign immunity and the tradition of officer 
suits are juxtaposed, one plausible view holds that sovereign immunity is the 
truly fundamental rule, while officer suits constitute an exception based on a 
legal “fiction” that government officials are not the government.88  But it is 
also plausible to think that the constitutional regime is committed even more 
fundamentally to a principle of accountability for constitutional violations, 
historically enforced through officer suits, with sovereign immunity being the 
more nearly fictional, honorific notion.89 
In my view, the ideas that the sovereign is immune from unconsented suit 
and that either the government or its officials must be accountable for 
constitutional violations exist in an ongoing tension.  Although federal 
sovereign immunity is by no means unimportant, it can be well understood and 
perspicuously assessed only in the context of a broader scheme of remedies for 
governmental wrong-doing.  In order to assess the significance of sovereign 
immunity, students need to know what alternate remedies may be available to 
people whose rights have been violated. 
2. State Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment 
Issues of state sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment have 
grown embarrassingly rich as the result of recent Supreme Court decisions and 
a surrounding outpouring of scholarship.90  An impressive body of literature 
explores the history of state sovereign immunity and its relationship to the 
perplexing language of the Eleventh Amendment.  Another historically 
inflected but also pragmatic literature examines the problematic nature of state 
sovereignty in the context of American federalism and the Supremacy Clause 
of Article VI, which proclaims the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the 
 
 86. See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 20 (1963). 
 87. 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (“All the officers of the government, from the highest to the 
lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.”). 
 88. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101–02 (1984). 
 89. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity “Exception,” 110 HARV. L. REV. 102, 
122 (1996). 
 90. Thus, the sixth edition of Hart and Wechsler accords seventy-two pages to this topic, in 
comparison with ten pages in the first edition. Compare HART & WECHSLER (6th ed.), supra note 
8, at 869–941, with HART & WECHSLER (1st ed.), supra note 2, at 810–20. 
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United States to be the supreme law of the land, binding on state courts, 
anything in state law to the contrary notwithstanding.91 
Issues of state sovereign immunity are so interesting and topical that it is 
hard to know what to cover and what to omit.  Whatever specific choices an 
instructor makes, I think it important to emphasize three large points. 
First, analysis of current problems should begin, even if it should not end, 
with the language of the Eleventh Amendment—which, strikingly, makes no 
reference to state sovereign immunity.  Contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
assumption in Hans v. Louisiana,92 the Eleventh Amendment could plausibly 
be read as establishing only that Article III does not of its own force strip the 
states of sovereign immunity from suits asserting state law causes of action 
that could otherwise have been brought against them under the federal courts’ 
diversity jurisdiction.93  (Under this so-called “diversity interpretation,” the 
Eleventh Amendment merely corrects the Supreme Court’s error in Chisholm 
v. Georgia,94 which held that Article III stripped the defendant state of 
immunity from suit against it in a breach of contract claim arising under state 
law.) 
Second, within the structure of constitutional federalism, state sovereign 
immunity is at most immunity from suit, not immunity from constitutional and 
legal obligation.  In such leading modern cases as Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida95 and Alden v. Maine,96 no one doubted that Congress could enact 
legislation creating rights against and imposing duties on the states.  The only 
question involved whether the states could claim immunity from suits seeking 
to enforce their undoubted obligations. 
Third, although state sovereign immunity frequently bars suits for money 
damages, prospective injunctive relief from ongoing violations of the 
Constitution and laws of the United States is almost always available in suits 
against state officials acting in their official capacities.  In other words, state 
sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment do not withdraw all 
mechanisms for enforcing federal law against the states.  My own conclusion is 
 
 91. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 92. 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). 
 93. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 258–60 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). Justice Brennan’s dissent in Atascadero built on several works of pioneering 
scholarship, including William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a 
Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983), and John J. Gibbons, The 
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 
1889 (1983). 
 94. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 428 (1793). 
 95. 517 U.S. 44, 55–56 (1996). 
 96. 527 U.S. 706, 730–31 (1999). 
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that state sovereign immunity, like federal sovereign immunity, is, accordingly, 
less important in practice than many of its critics have assumed. 
3. Suits Against State Officers and § 1983 
Judicial doctrine interpreting and implementing § 1983 is stupefyingly 
intricate.  In my opinion, the chief pedagogical challenge is to sort out as many 
complexities as possible without losing sight of underlying methodological and 
policy issues.  On the methodological front, the largest issue involves how the 
courts should interpret a Reconstruction-era statute that, if read literally, would 
create a cause of action against all state officials who violate any federal 
statutory or constitutional right.97  Although superficially attractive, a literalist 
approach would often yield untenable consequences.  For example, it would 
imply that state judges should be suable for damages whenever higher courts 
reverse their rulings on appeal on the ground that they deprived a party of 
constitutional rights.  History sheds some light on interpretive questions, but 
historic understandings and expectations are often debatable.  In the face of 
uncertain history, policy concerns would seem especially relevant.  Indeed, it is 
hard to understand the pattern of outcomes except on the assumption that the 
Justices tend to rule in accordance with their policy views.  However one may 
judge this claim, students should consider a variety of methodological 
questions involving how the Supreme Court does and should interpret § 1983. 
A second large theme concerns the relationship between § 1983 and 
substantive constitutional law.  If the Supreme Court believes that § 1983, read 
literally, would let too many of the “wrong” kinds of cases into federal court, it 
has at least three options: (i) enforce the statute literally anyway, (ii) develop a 
non-literal interpretation that would exclude some sub-set of suits seeking 
remedies for officials’ violations of the Constitution and laws of the United 
States, or (iii) narrowly construe the constitutional and statutory rights for 
violations of which § 1983 furnishes a cause of action.  On my reading, cases 
such as Parratt v. Taylor98 adopt the third approach by cutting back on 
constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause as a way to stem the flood 
of cases into federal court that § 1983 would otherwise authorize.99  If so, 
further evidence emerges that the Supreme Court tends to take a holistic view 
of the overall acceptability of packages of substantive rights, jurisdictional 
authorizations to sue, and judicial remedies.100 
 
 97. For a lucid and helpful discussion, see Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal 
Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482 (1982). 
 98. 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981). 
 99. See Fallon, supra note 20, at 309. 
 100. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
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4. Official Immunity 
Besides being intricate and important, the doctrines governing official 
immunity call attention once more to issues involving rights and remedies and 
the question whether there are constitutionally necessary remedies for 
constitutional rights violations.  Under current immunity doctrine, it occurs 
frequently that victims of constitutional rights violations will have no 
individually effective remedy: Sovereign immunity will preclude a direct suit 
against the government, while official immunity will bar damages relief from 
governmental officials.  Dan Meltzer and I once described, and tried to 
rationalize, the resulting state of affairs in the following terms: 
Few principles of the American constitutional tradition resonate more strongly 
than one stated in Marbury v. Madison: for every violation of a right, there 
must be a remedy.  Yet Marbury’s apparent promise of effective redress for all 
constitutional violations reflects a principle, not an ironclad rule, and its ideal 
is not always attained. 
  . . . Within our constitutional tradition . . . the Marbury dictum reflects just 
one of two principles supporting remedies. . . .  Another principle, whose focus 
is more structural, demands a system of constitutional remedies adequate to 
keep government generally within the bounds of law.  Both principles 
sometimes permit accommodation of competing interests, but in different 
ways.  The Marbury principle that calls for individually effective remediation 
can sometimes be outweighed [as, for example, when adequately powerful 
practical reasons call for the recognition of official immunity that will preclude 
some victims of rights violations from recovering damages]; the principle 
requiring an overall system of remedies that is effective in maintaining a 
regime of lawful government is more unyielding in its own terms, but can 
tolerate the denial of particular remedies [such as damages in cases in which 
immunity doctrines bar them], and sometimes of individual redress [as long as 
other remedies that are not barred by immunity doctrines and are available to 
other plaintiffs—such as injunctions—suffice to ensure that the right is not 
effectively nullified on a systemic basis]. 101 
Among the considerations supporting a regime in which official immunity 
can sometimes leave plaintiffs without individually effective redress for 
constitutional rights violations is a point advanced by John Jeffries: If every 
recognition of a novel constitutional right entailed that officials who had 
violated the right in the past were liable for damages, courts would face a 
powerful disincentive to adapt the substantive law in progressive directions.102  
For example, if the effect of Brown v. Board of Education103 would have been 
 
 101. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 14, at 1778–79. 
 102. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 
87, 88–90 (1999). 
 103. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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to render school officials liable for damages for maintaining segregated 
schools, the Supreme Court might have found it impossible to decide Brown as 
it did.104 
G. Hart and Wechsler Chapter X: Abstention Doctrines 
The Hart and Wechsler casebook styles the chapter on abstention doctrines 
as one on “Judicial Federalism.”  This label is apt: By abstaining, a federal 
court typically cedes authority to a state court, and considerations of federalism 
will sometimes weigh heavily in favor of a federal court’s doing so. 
Nevertheless, more is at stake.  Another important theme, related to the 
separation of powers, concerns the appropriateness of federal judicial 
assertions of “discretion” in determining whether to exercise statutorily 
conferred jurisdiction.  The indispensable article on this topic is David 
Shapiro’s Jurisdiction and Discretion.105  In recent years, the Supreme Court 
has asserted that federal courts may properly abstain only in suits in equity, in 
which, the Court says, Congress must be assumed to have authorized the 
exercise of judicial discretion;106 otherwise, the federal courts have an 
unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction that Congress has given them. 
In my view, the Court’s assertion that abstention is proper only in the 
exercise of equitable jurisdiction is misleading, if not disingenuous, insofar as 
the Justices assert—as they do—that it is a permissible exercise of jurisdiction, 
rather than abstention, for a federal court to “stay” proceedings at law until a 
state court action has run its course.107  In situations in which state court 
judgments would effectively terminate the “stayed” federal litigation under res 
judicata doctrine, a stay has the same practical effect as would a decision to 
abstain.  The policies that would support unapologetic and unconcealed 
abstention, and issues involving the appropriateness of judicial claims of 
discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction granted by Congress, should thus 
be very much on the table in discussions of abstention doctrine. 
When these topics are discussed historically and doctrinally, the 
conclusion seems irresistible that it has been one of the traditional roles of the 
federal courts to craft doctrines—not readily viewed as authorized by Congress 
 
 104. This thought experiment fortifies my judgment—contrary to the view of my colleague 
Daryl Levinson—that for some purposes it is extremely helpful analytically to distinguish rights 
from remedies and to consider how appropriate packages of rights and remedies would best be 
constructed.  But see Levinson, supra note 15, at 858 (arguing that it is a mistake to regard rights 
as meaningfully distinguishable from the remedies through which they are enforced).  
Nevertheless, I very much agree with Levinson that for some purposes it is the overall package 
that matters most.  Indeed, this is the central theme of my article The Linkage Between 
Justiciability and Remedies—And Their Connections to Substantive Rights, supra note 53. 
 105. Shapiro, supra note 9. 
 106. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 731 (1996). 
 107. Id. at 722–23. 
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if one uses “ordinary” modes of statutory interpretation—to promote what 
judges view as the sensible operation of judicial federalism.  Interestingly, 
however, this role makes the current Supreme Court, which has grown much 
more methodologically self-conscious about statutory interpretation than its 
predecessors, palpably uncomfortable, as witnessed, for example, by its 
insistence that the federal courts have no authority to abstain in suits at law.  
Recognition that the “conservative” Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have largely 
eschewed claims of federal judicial discretion to “abstain” in actions at law, 
even when doing so would promote state-federal comity, invites discussion of 
historically evolving varieties of judicial “conservatism.”108  It is often said 
that we have a conservative Supreme Court, but what, exactly, is judicial 
conservatism with respect to Federal Courts issues, and does the term 
contribute anything to our capacity to explain or predict patterns of judicial 
decision in Federal Courts cases? 
H. Hart and Wechsler Chapter XI: Federal Habeas Corpus 
In recent years I have closed my Federal Courts course with a unit on 
federal habeas corpus combined with a brief re-visitation of questions of 
congressional power to preclude or withdraw federal jurisdiction. 
1. Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Judgments 
In teaching habeas corpus, I begin with “collateral review” cases brought 
by state prisoners challenging the lawfulness of their convictions in state court.  
In considering the role of federal habeas corpus in cases arising from state 
court convictions, students should confront three large policy issues while also 
learning the details of the current jurisdictional scheme. 
The first policy issue involves whether federal habeas review should occur 
at all—and if so, why—in cases brought by petitioners who have raised their 
federal claims in, and nevertheless been convicted by, state courts.  The 
paradigmatic case is Brown v. Allen.109  In cases involving petitioners whose 
claims have been raised in and rejected by federal criminal courts, affording an 
opportunity for de novo relitigation on habeas would seem a profligate waste 
of resources.  The question whether de novo habeas review should occur in 
cases arising from state court convictions thus presents important issues of 
judicial federalism. 
The second policy issue is whether criminal defendants who failed to raise 
their federal claims properly in state court, and therefore could not have 
invoked the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction on direct review, should be 
 
 108. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s 
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 432–34 (2002). 
 109. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
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able to present those claims for the first time on federal habeas.110  In this type 
of case, permitting habeas review would inevitably generate state-federal 
frictions by excusing prisoners’ failure to comply with sensible state rules 
governing the raising of federal issues in state court.  But there is a competing 
interest in fairness to criminal defendants whose failure to raise their 
constitutional claims properly in state court will almost always have resulted 
from bad lawyering.  If a wealthy defendant with a first-rate lawyer would 
have benefited from a federal constitutional defense, is it fair to deny an 
impecunious defendant with a second-rate or badly overworked trial lawyer the 
same opportunity?  It is far from obvious how the balance should be struck—
especially because even if one worries about the unfairness of impoverished 
defendants having inadequate legal representation, the authorization of habeas 
review of constitutional claims represents a clumsy response to the problem (in 
contrast with, for example, the establishment of rules or policies that would 
tend to ensure criminal defendants better representation in the first instance). 
The third policy issue involves the question whether, following a change of 
law as a result of Supreme Court decisionmaking, those who have previously 
been convicted of crimes should be able to use habeas as a vehicle to have the 
newly declared law applied retroactively to their cases.111  Significantly, this is 
not distinctively a problem of federalism; retroactivity issues would equally 
arise in a unitary system.  A tangled mix of policy issues bears on this 
question—among them, the worry that mandatory retroactivity on habeas 
would make it extremely difficult if not impossible for the Supreme Court to 
expand the rights of criminal defendants in the ways that it did, for example, in 
Mapp v. Ohio112 and Miranda v. Arizona.113  The Court almost certainly could 
not have decided Miranda as it did if its decision implied that the prison doors 
would need to swing open for every criminal defendant whose conviction 
rested on a confession obtained without a Miranda warning. 
Beyond understanding the central policy issues, students should of course 
learn the current rules governing the availability of federal habeas, which the 
 
 110. The currently leading case on this topic, which provides a good ventilation of the issues, 
is Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
 111. For discussion, see generally Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 14, at 1813–20. 
 112. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth 
Amendment is enforceable against the states and that “all evidence obtained by searches and 
seizures in violation of the Constitution is . . . inadmissible in a state court.”). 
 113. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that prosecution cannot admit into evidence 
statements by defendant obtained from custodial interrogation by law enforcement officers 
“unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the [Fifth 
Amendment’s] privilege against self-incrimination.”). 
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1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act114 (AEDPA) straitened 
dramatically.  It is little exaggeration to say that the AEDPA turned a writ that 
was traditionally regarded as a guarantor of fundamental fairness into a 
procedural maze that very few petitioners can hope to navigate successfully.  
According to an important recent study of cases in the district courts, the post-
AEDPA success rate for habeas petitions by state prisoners is down to 0.3% in 
non-capital cases.115  Another study, this one involving cases in the courts of 
appeals, concludes that the rate of dismissals on procedural grounds rose from 
73% to 82% between 1997 and 2004. 116  These empirical findings strike me as 
a particularly depressing variation on the recurring Federal Courts theme of the 
relation between substance and procedure. 
2. Federal Habeas Review of Executive Detentions 
The historically most fundamental office of habeas corpus was not to 
review state criminal convictions, but to examine the legality of detentions by 
executive officials in the absence of prior judicial authorization.117  Executive 
actions and congressional enactments in connection with the war on terror have 
given issues involving habeas jurisdiction to review executive detentions new 
currency. 
As Dan Meltzer and I have written,118 habeas cases arising from executive 
detention present at least three issues, all with both a statutory and a 
constitutional dimension.  First, does a federal court have statutory jurisdiction 
to entertain a petition for habeas corpus and, if not, does the Constitution’s 
Suspension Clause119 mandate the availability of habeas jurisdiction?120 
Second, what are the substantive and procedural grounds on which a court 
possessing habeas jurisdiction can issue the writ?121 
Third, to the extent that a detention rests on prior determinations by a non-
Article III tribunal that a detainee satisfies criteria adequate in principle to 
 
 114. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, secs. 101–
108, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253–2255, 2261–2266 
(2006)). 
 115. See KING ET AL., supra note 26, at 8.  Pre-AEDPA studies had shown a success rate of 
1% to 4% in non-capital cases.  See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 1219. 
 116. See John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 286 
(2006). 
 117. See Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 961 (1998). 
 118. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive 
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029 (2007). 
 119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 120. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), presented a question of this 
kind. 
 121. Issues of this kind were at stake in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
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justify a detention, to what extent are the administrative determinations 
reviewable by a federal habeas court?  In other words, what is the statutorily 
specified or constitutionally mandated scope of review? 
Although merely sorting out these issues both takes work and advances 
students’ understanding, discussion of their appropriate resolution is likely to 
prove difficult and contentious.  Treating these issues at the end of the course 
allows the instructor to pull together a variety of themes involving the 
separation of powers and notions of constitutionally necessary remedies at a 
time when—if the course has gone well—students will be prepared to reason 
with, rather than shout at, one another. 
CONCLUSION 
There is a lot to teach in a Federal Courts course—and a lot for students to 
learn.  Inescapably, the subject matter is difficult, but the rewards can be great. 
In conclusion, I would stress three points.  First, instructors should 
structure the course to permit cumulative learning.  Students should achieve 
both breadth and depth of understanding by building on what they have learned 
before, often in other courses, and by coming to appreciate connections among 
Federal Courts issues and doctrines. 
Second, both teaching and learning should be thematic.  Doctrinal topics 
should not just yield doctrinal learning, but should be portrayed as exhibiting 
variations on recurring themes involving the separation of powers, federalism, 
necessary and contingent connections between rights and remedies, the 
relationship of procedure to substance, the proper exercise of judicial 
discretion, and appropriate techniques of constitutional and statutory 
interpretation. 
Third, Federal Courts teachers should draw on the best available 
contemporary historical scholarship, political science, political theory, and 
theories of constitutional and statutory interpretation.  We may continue to 
examine issues and ask questions first linked as defining the content of a 
Federal Courts course by Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler.  But we can and 
should utilize new sources of learning and give answers to old questions that 
Hart and Wechsler would have found horrifying.  It is time for those of us who 
teach and write in the field to get over old anxieties and move ahead 
unapologetically with our teaching and our scholarship. 
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